FEATURES OF A PARADIGM CASE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE*

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is not to define civil disobedience, but to identify a paradigm case of civil disobedience and the features exemplified in it. After noting the benefits of this methodological approach, the paper proceeds with an examination of two key, interconnected features: conscientiousness and communication. First, a link is made between the conscientious aspect of civil disobedience and moral consistency; a civil disobedient demonstrates a conscientious commitment to certain values through her willingness to condemn, and to dissociate herself from, governmental decisions that violate those values. A parallel is then drawn between the communicative aspect of civil disobedience and the communicative aspect of lawful punishment by the state. Both practices are associated with an aim to demonstrate protest against certain types of conduct and an aim to bring about a change in that conduct. In paradigm situations, a civil disobedient aims to lead policymakers not only to reform existing law, but also to internalise her objections so as to produce a lasting change in the law. Having such aims places some constraints upon the modes of communication that she reasonably may use to achieve these aims. This paper concludes by considering three controversial modes of communication – coercion, publicity and violence.

KEY WORDS: civil disobedience, communication, conscientiousness, paradigm, publicity, punishment, violence

The standard approach when examining civil disobedience is to give a definition for this type of dissent, that is, to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for civilly disobedient action. Since, however, definitions tend to be overly rigid and tend, as a consequence, to anticipate evaluation, I shall take a different approach and identify what I take to

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be a typical or paradigm case of civil disobedience. The features exemplified in such a case, I argue, are, broadly speaking, conscientiousness and communication. My aim is not to draw the boundaries between civil disobedience and other types of political action, but rather to specify a broad class of actions which in general count as civil disobedience. I begin by outlining the benefits of the methodological approach I have adopted. I then make explicit the role played by both conscientiousness and communication in this paradigm case.

**METHODOLOGY**

The aim of the paradigm case approach is to combat scepticism, either in general or in relation to specific cases, about whether As are B. The argument is that, to be able to doubt either that there is any A that is B or that a particular A is B, one must have an idea of what B is, and this idea is, or can be, gained by pointing to something that is B. Since such an example of B picks out what B is, it would be absurd to doubt whether that example, or paradigm case, is B. Thus, the sceptical position is refuted.

In applying this approach to the problem of civil disobedience, I aim to quash scepticism about whether a particular class of actions counts as civil disobedience, and thus to combat indirectly any general scepticism about whether there is an action that is civil disobedience. The actions I shall consider exemplify certain key features: these actions involve (1) conscientious and (2) communicative breaches of law for the purpose of (3) demonstrating protest against a law and/or (4) persuading lawmakers to change the law. My claim is that one can point to actions with these features to gain an idea of what civil disobedience is and that, hence, it would be absurd to doubt whether these actions in general are civil disobedience: they can be taken as typical or paradigm examples of civil disobedience.

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2 A paradigm case, on this reading, is a descriptive case, not a normative case. I aim, not to identify a model or ideal case of civil disobedience, but rather to identify a class of actions that are clear examples of civil disobedience.

3 I do not claim that these are the only features that could be exemplified in a typical case of civil disobedience. I allow for the possibility of alternative paradigm cases that exhibit different features.

Within this class of actions there will be some variation in the extent to which the key features are exemplified. Note, first, that these features may be interpreted in different ways, namely, as matters of degree, or as items on a list, or as some combination of the two. I stipulate that an action may be regarded as a paradigm case if it exemplifies many or all of the relevant features to an appropriate degree. This view makes room for oddball cases that do not fully exemplify the key features. Actions that either lack one or two features or exhibit some features to a lesser degree still can count as paradigm examples of civil disobedience provided that they exemplify the other relevant features to an appropriate degree.

A paradigm case approach enjoys some advantages over a definitional approach. As noted above, a definition implies that civil disobedience has clear edges. Since, however, people undertake political dissent for a variety of reasons and their dissent takes a variety of forms, it is not possible to draw sharp lines between civil disobedience and other types of dissent such as conscientious objection, terrorism and revolutionary action. Thus, a paradigm case approach, which specifies only what surely counts as civil disobedience, is more accommodating of the complexities in this multifarious practice than a definitional approach would be.

Moreover, the paradigm case approach avoids the dialectic of generalisation and counterexample that applies to definitions. One can undermine a definition for $B$ either by presenting an example of $B$ that does not fit with the definition or by presenting an example of something that is not $B$ but does fit with the definition. By contrast, one cannot undermine an account of a paradigm case of $B$ by either of these methods. Some might object that one can undermine an account of a paradigm case by pointing to an example of something that exhibits the features of the paradigm case, but is not an instance of $B$. In relation to civil disobedience, the objection would be that an action that clearly is not civil disobedience nonetheless could exhibit the key features of a paradigm case of civil disobedience and, consequently, would have to be regarded on the paradigm case approach as a typical or paradigm case of civil disobedience. In reply, since it is the features exemplified in paradigm cases that give us an idea of what civil disobedience is, only those actions that are civilly disobedient

\[5\] The standards for what constitutes an appropriate degree may be provided by common sense.
could be taken as typical or paradigm cases of civil disobedience. A counterexample could pose a challenge only if the features of the paradigm case were described in overly broad terms. When the relevant features are properly specified, the paradigm case approach can resist counterexamples. In what follows, I shall endeavour to make explicit the role played by conscientiousness and communication in a paradigm case of civil disobedience.

**CONSCIENTIOUSNESS**

_Seriousness and Sincerity_

Let me first specify the notion of _conscientiousness_ that is in play. Conscientiousness is characterised by an obedience or loyalty to conscience. It is associated with earnestness, care, diligence, scrupulousness and consistency. Although many of these qualities seem admirable, conscientiousness does not always carry a positive connotation. The conscientious person sometimes seems pedantic, critical of failings in others, and fixated on details at the expense of more important concerns. Conscientiousness, on this reading, is not a virtue, but simply an attitude marked by certain attributes. The various qualities associated with conscientiousness can be captured, I believe, by two attributes: _sincerity_ and _seriousness_.

Conscientiousness essentially involves a sincere and serious commitment to, or belief about, something. Sincerity and seriousness can manifest themselves in certain intentions and actions, but not in others. They cannot manifest themselves, for example, in self-deceiving intentions or actions, since self-deception contravenes the loyalty to conscience and the earnestness that are identified with conscientiousness. This does not mean that a person cannot be conscientiously deceitful or frivolous. Rather, it means that she cannot engage in actions, or have intentions, that could not be pursued with seriousness and sincerity. This places only a minimal constraint upon the actual content of her intentions.

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6 Note the difference between two senses of _seriousness_. First, there is the seriousness associated with earnestness, solemnity, and sincerity, which contrasts with frivolousness or flippancy. Second, there is the seriousness understood as significance, gravity or importance. It is the first of these two senses that I associate with conscientiousness.
actions or intentions: most actions or intentions can be supported by sincerity and seriousness. Some marks of a sincere and serious commitment or belief include: constancy, a degree of self-sacrifice, a willingness to take risks, a spontaneous response to opposition, and a capacity to defend the reasons for engaging in the pursuit. Such marks of commitment reflect a person’s adherence to her own sincerely held beliefs about what she has reason to do.

The Conscientious Aspect of Civil Disobedience

In relation to civil disobedience, conscientiousness takes the form of a sincere and serious belief that a law or policy warrants revision and that the values that underpin that belief are sufficiently weighty to require a breach of law in their defence. Conscientiousness requires that a person who sincerely believes that a certain type of decision or policy is misguided or seriously wrong not only avoid that type of decision herself, but also judge the conduct of her government when it pursues such decisions as being misguided or wrong. Moreover, her belief commits her to communicating this judgment in some situations. Antony Duff states in a generalised context (which highlights the connection between conscientiousness and communication) that ‘[t]o remain silent, to let the action pass without criticism, necessarily casts doubt on the sincerity of [her] declaration that such conduct is seriously wrong.’

In relation to civil disobedience, we must say something more circumspect, namely, that a person’s judgment about governmental decisions gives her reasons to communicate her objections through disobedience of the law; but she must balance these reasons against other reasons when deciding how to act. Other commitments, such as her commitments to particular persons, may give her weighty reasons not to communicate her objections in this way, especially when the consequences of disobedience for her and those close to her would be severe.

What matters for conscientiousness is that a person acknowledge the reasons for action that are generated by her commitments and beliefs. The person who believes that a law or policy requires revision and that the values behind her judgment are sufficiently weighty to warrant a breach of law in their defence would be

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morally inconsistent to deny that she has reasons to engage in civil disobedience against that law or policy. Moreover, her denial would show a lack of respect for her own values. Considerations of self-respect and moral consistency thus give her subjective intrinsic reasons relating to her own values to communicate her judgments by dissociating herself from laws that she opposes.\(^8\) I shall return to this topic in my discussion of communication. My point for now is simply that the person who believes that a law warrants revision and who makes an all things considered judgment to engage in civil disobedience against that law demonstrates the sincerity, seriousness and consistency of commitment found in true conscientiousness.

Although conscientiousness demands that a person sincerely believe that she has good reasons to act as she does, it does not demand that she be correct in her judgments about either her own actions or the law to which she objects. In brief, a person’s belief in the inappropriateness or moral defectiveness of a law need not be true and justified for her action to be conscientious; what matters is how that action relates to her values and beliefs. Hugo Bedau observes that there is no logical reason why, for example, a person could not commit civil disobedience against the desegregation of schools in the United States.\(^9\) A person might believe that children develop better without the pressures of multi-ethnic interaction, or she might believe that desegregation causes children to lose touch with their cultural heritage. Or, less appealingly, she might believe that some ethnic groups are inferior to others and should be educated separately. Alternatively, she might not be able to state why she believes that she ought to oppose this policy: her action might be entirely spontaneous. Even so, her action is conscientious if it aligns with her deeply held values and beliefs. Since correctness of judgment is not a key feature of our paradigm case of civil disobedience, the actions of the person who opposes desegregation can count, absent other constraints, as an instance of this paradigm case.

\(^8\) Subjective intrinsic reasons contrast with objective intrinsic reasons which derive from a respect for the value of an institution or practice that is objectively valuable. Intrinsic reasons as a class contrast with instrumental reasons, which highlight the potential impact of an action. See Philip Soper, The Ethics of Deference: Learning from Law’s Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 25–7, 136–8.

\(^9\) Bedau, op. cit., 660.
In summary, conscientiousness points to the sincerity, seriousness and moral consistency of a person’s commitments. To appreciate the centrality of conscientiousness to civil disobedience, we must consider this feature in relation to communication. I shall argue, as anticipated above, that, in paradigm situations, the communicative aims of civil disobedience stem from a person’s conscientious commitment to certain values and beliefs.

**COMMUNICATION**

*Aspects of Communication*

What does it take to communicate successfully? First, at least two persons must be involved. Unlike expression, which does not require an audience (one can express one’s grief or happiness alone in the desert, for example) communication is an *other*-directed activity. It requires both a ‘speaker’ and a ‘hearer’. The speaker uses specific means of communication – words, allusions, images, body movements, facial expressions – to convey to the hearer news, information, ideas, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, etc. When communicating, the speaker must consider whether the content of her message is something that the hearer has the capacity to understand. She must also consider whether the means that she uses to communicate her message are likely to foster that understanding. Finally, she must consider what impact her mode or manner of communication has upon the hearer. 10 Some modes of communication relevant to civil disobedience include: coercion, violence, publicity, collective action and direct or indirect action. (I shall touch on coercion, violence and publicity later.) Although the speaker’s choice of means and mode of communication may hinder or promote communication, the success of communication depends as much upon the hearer as it does upon the speaker. The hearer’s decision to remain receptive to what the speaker conveys determines whether communication succeeds. This point is significant in relation to civil disobedience, as it places certain

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10 Note the difference between the means and the modes of communication. I understand *means* to refer to the types of action that people use to communicate and *mode* to refer to the manner in which these actions are performed, be it violently or peacefully, collectively or individually, privately or publicly, directly or indirectly, and so on.
constraints upon the kinds of individual or group that can count as legitimate hearers or targets of civil disobedience.\footnote{11 Some minimal constraints apply, for example, to the kind of government that a person may regard as a viable hearer of civilly disobedient communication. The government must be one that has the potential to be receptive. It is unlikely that the lawmakers in either a totalitarian dictatorship or a nation at war would be potentially receptive hearers of dissenting voices. In such circumstances, a person may need either to address bodies other than the government or to construe the notion of government broadly to include organs or bodies within the political arena that are both potentially receptive to her communication of her position and able to make a claim to the attention of the executive.}

Communication is understood here as intentional communication, and may be contrasted with incidental or contingent communication. The latter points to occasions where a speaker communicates things to a hearer without intending it or perhaps realising it: for example, a speaker’s face may betray her, or her words may reveal more about her views than she realises; or her aim may be to bring about a certain end to which communication of that aim is incidental. This is not the kind of communication that I take to be central to the class of actions that count as civil disobedience. Rather, my claim is that such actions exemplify the intention to communicate certain views and ideas through disobedience of the law.\footnote{12 It is true that, through civil disobedience, people may unintentionally communicate other things as well.}

The Communicative Aspect of Civil Disobedience

Though not a defining feature, communication lurks behind many well-known accounts of civil disobedience. John Rawls, for one, emphasises the public and political nature of civil disobedience, and Joseph Raz emphasises the aim of expressing protest against a law or policy. However, these seeming nods to communication require some refinement. Rawls’s claim that civil disobedience must be public goes too far since people sometimes must act covertly to avoid being prevented by authorities from engaging in civil disobedience. (I return to this later.) Raz’s claim that one of the aims of civil disobedience is to express protest does not really go far enough since, as indicated earlier, expression can be a solitary endeavour. My project is to tease out and make explicit the role played by communication in a typical case of civil disobedience.
To begin, there is a parallel that I wish to explore between the communicative aspect of civil disobedience and the communicative aspect of lawful punishment of a wrongdoer by the state. First, both processes reflect things about the parties engaged in them. It is a mark of society’s adherence to certain values that it is willing to condemn individuals’ actions when those actions violate or contravene these values. Likewise, it is a mark of a person’s adherence to certain values that she is willing to condemn the actions of her government when those actions violate these values; as noted above, a person shows the moral consistency of her commitments when she decides to communicate her objections through disobedience of the law. Second, the communicative theory of lawful punishment offers a useful starting-point for an analysis of the aims of civil disobedience. Like lawful punishment, civil disobedience can be associated with an aim to demonstrate protest and an aim to bring about change. I shall consider each of these aims in turn.

In punishing a wrongdoer, Joel Feinberg argues, the state seeks to convey its disavowal, condemnation and denunciation of the crime committed, as well as its desire for repentance and reformation on the part of the wrongdoer. Similarly, in civilly disobeying the law, a person seeks to convey her disavowal and condemnation of a law, as well as her dissociation from both that law and the government that enacted it. Her disavowal and condemnation essentially involve a rejection of the values upheld by this law or policy. Dissociation, by contrast, involves a public declaration by the dissenter that she is wholly unconnected with the law in question, so much so that she is willing to violate a law, either that law or another law, and expose herself to the risk of punishment and censure to demonstrate her personal detachment from it. By dissociating herself from a law, this person makes it clear that the government does not speak for her when it enacts and enforces this law.

To whom are these attitudes addressed? Once again, the communicative theory of lawful punishment offers some useful considerations. Through punishment, the state naturally addresses the wrongdoer. But it may also address the society as a whole, or the international community, or the victims of the wrongdoing. When the state communicates to these groups, it aims to achieve certain ends. According to the
communicative theory of punishment, in addressing the wrongdoer, the state attempts to engage her in a moral dialogue. It aims rationally to persuade her of the wrongness of her action and to bring her to repent that action so that she reforms her conduct and seeks to recompense injured parties. In addressing the public, the state aims, amongst other things, to confirm the innocence of other people, to reassure people of their safety and security, and to deter people from violating the law. In communicating to the international community, the state aims, perhaps, to reassure allies or to demonstrate domestic order. Finally, in communicating to victims of the wrongdoing, the state aims to show them that their interests have not been disregarded.

Similarly, through her disobedience, a person presumably addresses, in the first instance, the policymakers who enacted the law that she challenges. But she may address also the victims of that law if such victims exist, or the society, or other dissenters, or other communities not affected by the law. Now, she may aim simply to demonstrate to these groups her disavowal, condemnation, and disassociation from the law. But it is probable that, like the state, she has the further aim of bringing about change. Civil disobedience, like lawful punishment, has a forward-looking element. By breaching the law, a person may aim both to bring about a change in current laws or policies and to prevent the development of new laws or policies similar to those that she currently finds objectionable. Note that she need not have a concrete conception of what the law should become to aim to reform the law. She simply may believe that the present law is unacceptable and should be replaced. Alternatively, she may believe that a law should not be replaced by anything at all. She may believe that the law has no place in a given area of people’s lives. Finally, she may believe that the law is not objectionable in itself and so does not require substantive revision, but nonetheless must be re-examined in light of current values. She may think, for example, that a reasonable law formulated without the democratic participation of all adult members of society requires reconsideration. Each of these attitudes is in keeping with the aim to reform the law. To bring this forward-looking aim into focus, we must consider it in relation to each of the groups that might be targeted in a paradigm case of civil disobedience. Let us consider policymakers first.

14 In his forthcoming article ‘Historical Injustice: The Other Two Domains’, Thomas Pogge considers both the moral status of laws developed under such conditions and the ways, in general, that past injustices continue in present social rules.
As suggested just now, the forward-looking aim of civil disobedience has two parts. The aim is to lead policymakers not only to reform existing law, but also to internalise the reasons behind the dissenter’s condemnation and disavowal of that law. Having these kinds of aims places certain restrictions upon the modes of civilly disobedient communication that a person reasonably may use to realise her aims. One could argue that it would be unreasonable for her to pursue her aims through a coercive mode of communication, since coercion essentially involves the use of force and intimidation to restrain, compel or influence people irrespective of their rights or civil liberties. As a strategy, coercion is likely to turn policymakers against a dissenter’s position. Therefore, presumably, to have the lasting effect upon policymakers’ opinions and values that she desires, a dissenter must aim, not to force policymakers to adopt her views, but rationally to persuade them of the flaws in the law or policy she opposes. In short, to be sincere and serious in her aim to bring about a lasting change in governmental policies, she must recognise the importance of engaging policymakers in a moral dialogue. (Note, though, that coercion nonetheless is available to a civil disobedient as an intermediate or instrumental mode of communication. It is consistent with conscientiously held commitments to try to force an issue onto the table so that policymakers may be rationally persuaded of its merits.)

Let us consider other potential hearers or targets of civil disobedience. In addressing the victims of a law (if such victims exist) a person’s primary aim, presumably, is to communicate that not all members of society believe that this law is acceptable. By communicating her dissociation from this law, particularly when that law does not negatively affect her, a person demonstrates a certain sense of duty toward fellow citizens. She shows that she recognises the reasons that she has, based upon self-respect and respect for others, to challenge laws that threaten others’ rights or fundamental interests. Consider a historical example. By not paying the poll tax established to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, Henry David Thoreau communicated to slaves, first, that he dissociated himself from the laws that repressed them, and second, that his actions reflected his beliefs and values.

Through civil disobedience, a person may also address society at large, perhaps in the hope of building support for her position. The same is true when she addresses other dissenters or potential dissenters. One of her aims may be to persuade these hearers that the merits of her cause are sufficient to warrant a breach of law in their
defence. There is a pragmatic reason for doing this: often broad-based, collective support for an issue is needed to touch a nerve with the executive or the legislature.

Finally, a person may address communities or governments not connected to the law she opposes. She may address societies that have similar policies to her own and that might change their policies if made to realise that the kind of dissent they observe elsewhere could arise within their own borders. In communicating to such parties, a person may also indirectly address her own government or society, bringing international attention to the law she opposes.

Naturally, a person may aim to communicate to more than one audience at a time. Doing so, however, requires a complex strategy, since the modes of communication that most effectively reach one hearer may not be the same for another hearer. Let me then examine further some modes of communication relevant to an account of a typical case of civil disobedience.

**Modes of Communication: Publicity and Violence**

Two controversial modes of communication relevant to civil disobedience are publicity and violence. Publicity is a criterion within the standard definition of civil disobedience. According to Rawls, civil disobedience is never covert or secretive; it is only ever committed in public, openly, and with fair notice to legal authorities.\(^{15}\) Bedau defends a similar claim. He states that usually it is essential to the dissenter’s purpose that both the government and the public know what she intends to do.\(^{16}\) Although I do not deny that sometimes advance warning may be essential to a person’s strategy, this is not always the case with civil disobedience. As noted earlier, publicity sometimes detracts from, or undermines, the attempt to communicate through civil disobedience. Brian Smart points out that, if a person publicises her intention to breach the law, then she provides both political opponents and legal authorities with the opportunity to abort her efforts to communicate.\(^{17}\) For this reason, covert disobedience is sometimes more successful than action undertaken publicly and with fair warning. Only after the fact does a person need

\(^{15}\) Rawls, op. cit., 366.

\(^{16}\) Bedau, op. cit., 655.

to make it known that an act of civil disobedience has occurred, and what the motivation behind it is.  

The second controversial mode of communication is violence. On the account defended by Rawls, civil disobedience displays neither coercion nor violence. Rawls states that

To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address. Indeed, any interference with the civil liberties of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one’s act. Sometimes if the appeal fails in its purpose, forceful resistance may later be entertained. Yet, civil disobedience is giving voice to conscientious and deeply held convictions; while it may warn and admonish, it is not itself a threat.

I think a less restrictive attitude toward violence is required. While I have suggested that, in a typical case, civil disobedience is essentially non-coercive, I would not make the same suggestion concerning violence. Discriminate violence is not by definition a coercive measure. Nor is it by definition incompatible with conscientious intentions. To clarify the point, consider the Buddhist monk who sets himself on fire in front of an American embassy to protest against US foreign policy. Or consider the anti-war protestors who damage or destroy military equipment. These breaches of law are violent, but non-coercive.

As Raz observes, the harm to others caused by both non-violent acts and legal acts is sometimes worse than that caused by violence. Therefore, there is no general reason why violent action should not be available to a person who engages in civil disobedience. Moreover, the wrong that this person perceives sometimes may be so iniquitous that it is right to use violence to root it out. Such violence may be necessary to preserve or to re-establish the rights and civil liberties that coercive practices seek to suspend. Finally, violence does not necessarily obscure the communicative quality of civil disobedience, as Rawls and Peter Singer suggest it does. While I grant that violence of the sort engaged in by the Buddhist monk is not as explicit or as subtle as a verbal declaration of dissent, I maintain that this kind

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18 Raz, op. cit., 265.
19 Rawls, op. cit., 366.
of discriminate, well-considered violent civil disobedience can provide an eloquent statement of both the dissenter’s frustration and the importance of the issues he addresses. For these reasons, the use of violence can support rather than undermine the conscientious and communicative aspects of civil disobedience.

This does not alter the fact that non-violent dissent is normally to be preferred. Some moral considerations are, as Raz notes, that non-violence avoids the direct harm caused by violence, and non-violence does not encourage violence in other situations where violence would be wrong, something which an otherwise warranted use of violence may do. Moreover, on a prudential note, non-violence does not carry the same risk of antagonising potential allies or confirming the antipathy of opponents.\textsuperscript{22} I would add that non-violence does not distract the attention of the public, and non-violence does not give authorities an excuse to use violent countermeasures against dissenters. Given these considerations, a person should use violence in civil disobedience prudently, discriminately and with great reluctance.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

We have seen that conscientiousness and communication are closely connected. Since conscientiousness requires moral consistency, a person who sincerely believes that a decision or policy is inappropriate or wrong has weighty reasons to communicate that judgment through actions that disassociate her from such decisions. When the objectionable decision takes the form of a law, civil disobedience offers this person a way to remain true to conscientiously held beliefs and values. Moreover, the conscientiousness and communication of civil disobedience are linked to certain aims. One is the aim to demonstrate protest against a law; another is the aim to bring about a change in the law. The sincerity of these aims (the second in particular) is reflected in the mode of civilly disobedient communication that a person adopts: aiming not to coerce, but to persuade lawmakers and the public of the need to revise a law or policy is a mode of communication that demonstrates conscientiousness.

Despite the ties between these several features, they can to a certain extent pull apart, as suggested in the first section. A conscien-

\textsuperscript{22} Raz, op.cit., 267.
tious breach of law might fail to communicate successfully with any of the intended hearers. Or a conscientious and communicative breach of law might lack the aims that I have identified as paradigmatic of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, provided that such actions exemplify the other key features to an appropriate degree (and are supported by aims that reasonably may be conceived of in the political realm) these actions still may be regarded as typical cases of civil disobedience. They fall within that class of actions that one may point to to gain an idea of what civil disobedience is; and therefore, it would be absurd to doubt whether such actions count as civil disobedience.

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