Co-convenors: Prof Steve Fuller (Sociology) and Prof Roger Trigg (Philosophy)

Seminar meets Thursdays, 10-12, Ramphal 1.03

The course is intended to give a thorough background in contemporary social theory and the philosophy of social science. It is genuinely interdisciplinary and is jointly taught by the Departments of Philosophy and of Sociology. Teaching and learning proceed by means of weekly seminars, six formal essays and a dissertation. Students may follow the course on a full-time or a part-time basis.

• To demonstrate an understanding of the major positions in 20^th century social theory and philosophy of the social sciences.
• To appreciate the various relationships between 'theoretical' and 'empirical' pursuits in sociology.
• To acquire skills in reading carefully and critically difficult texts that have shaped recent debates in social theory and philosophy of the social sciences.
• To acquire competence in the formulation and analysis of philosophical arguments about the social sciences.
• To develop an ability to present, in both oral and written form, materials in this field to an informed and interested audience.

All students must take the two-term Core Course (‘Philosophy and Social Theory’) in their first year of study. The exact topics are determined in a class meeting in the first week of the first two terms. What follows is a composite of the last two years, but we expect that students will want to add and subtract topics, according to their interests. The core course meets each week for two hours.

In addition, students must take two further two-term courses or an equivalent combination of one-term and two-term courses. At least one of these courses must be offered by the Department of Philosophy and one by the Department of Sociology. In choosing optional modules, participants are urged to ensure that they acquire a thorough grounding in both disciplines. In particular, they should strengthen any deficiencies in their knowledge (e.g. those with a Philosophy degree should take some Sociology courses and vice versa). The choice of options is made in consultation with the course convenors. No students are permitted by the Board of Examiners to prepare a dissertation if have not satisfactorily completed course work equivalent to six one-term courses.

Students are required to write ONE essay of 5,000 words for each one-term course and TWO essays of 5,000 words for each two-term course. In exceptional circumstances, permission may be granted for students to submit ONE essay of 10,000 words for a two-term course. A written application must be made in advance to one of the course convenors for permission to submit a double-weighted essay. Topics and titles for essays must be agreed in advance with the course convenors. The Philosophy Department supplies forms on which agreed topics and word length are recorded. Up to two essays may be proposed as ‘drafts’, subject to resubmission, if approved by the course’s Internal Examiners.

Students who successfully complete six essays will normally be permitted to prepare a dissertation. Dissertation topics must be approved by one of the Course Convenors. Formal proposals of dissertation topics must be submitted to one of the Course Convenors by Friday of Week 6 in Term 3. Students should request supervision for their dissertations from members of academic staff. The length of dissertations (including Abstract, notes, references or bibliography, and appendices) must not exceed 10,000 words, unless a written application for permission to submit a longer dissertation has been received and approved by one of the Course Convenors.

The degree of M.A. is awarded to students who satisfactorily complete all their essays and their dissertation. The Diploma is available to students who complete all their essays but do not proceed to write a dissertation. The course uses the marking conventions of the Philosophy Department. Thus, the pass mark for each piece of written work is 60%, and a distinction is awarded for work marked at 70% or above. The M.A. Review Board meets in mid-June to assess students’ progress, and the Final Board meets in mid-September. The M.A. with distinction is awarded to a student who gains a Distinction in four or more of the eight assessed units (the Dissertation and double-weighted essays count as two units). All marks are subject to confirmation by the External Examiner.

Two meetings were convened toward the end of the first two terms. Students raised issues relating to library provision for the course and the lack of common room for them to meet (especially given the interdisciplinary nature of the course). The former is being addressed directly, while the latter was forwarded to university committees responsible for space.

G. Delanty, Social Science

J. Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences

D. Little, Varieties of Social Explanation

P. Manicas, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences

M. Martin & L. McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science

A. Sica (eds.), What Is Social Theory?

R. Trigg, Understanding Social Science

(1) Can philosophy 'limit' sociology? Can sociology 'supersede' philosophy?

(2) Distinguish some projects that might be identified with the expressions: 'sociology of philosophy' and 'philosophy of sociology'. Do these projects stand in some logical relation to each other?

(3) What is relationship between 'social theory' and the disciplinary purviews of philosophy and sociology?

R. Collins, 'Toward a theory of Intellectual change: the social causes of philosophies', Science, Technology and Human Values

S. Fuller, 'Prolegomena to a Sociology of Philosophy in the 20^th century English-Speaking World', Philosophy of the Social Sciences

R. Trigg, Understanding Social Science, chaps. 1 and 10

D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery

P. Bourdieu, 'An Epistemology for Sociology'.

R. Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, chap. 15

S. Fuller, 'The Structure-Agency Craze', in A. Sica (eds.), What Is Social Theory?

A. Giddens, New Rules of the Sociological Method, 2^nd edn.

M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences

P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science

1. In what senses is a society more than the sum of its individual members?
2. Although the titles of their books differ only slightly, discuss how this difference reflects a much deeper difference in orientation between Berger & Luckmann and Searle.
3. What is the difference between 'social constructionism' and 'social realism'

P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Introduction and chap.1

J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, chaps. 1-2

M. Archer, Culture and Agency

R. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism

F. Collin, Social Reality

E. Durkheim, Rules of the Sociological Method

S. Fuller, Social Epistemology

A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society

M. Gilbert, Social Facts

I. Hacking, The Social Construction of What?

R. Harre, Social Being

R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, chap. 3

S. Turner, The Social Theory of Practices

1. What are relativism and realism theories of?
2. Can social science be done without taking a principled stance for either relativism and realism?
3. What do relativists and realists dislike the most about each other's views?

A. Collier, An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy, chaps. 1, 5

R. Trigg, Rationality and Science, chaps.1-2

M.Archer, et al. (eds.) Critical Realism: Essential Readings.

D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery

J. R. Brown, The Rational and the Social

S. Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge, chap. 9

M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism

M. Krausz and J. Meiland (eds) Relativism

T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life

J. Leplin, ed. Scientific Realism

J.F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition

K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia

H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History

R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

B. Wilson (ed.), Rationality

(1) How would you distinguish the following three entities from each other: moral theory, legal theory, social theory?

(2) How do the 'facts' of the human condition constrain the possibilities for moral legislation? Is pragmatism sufficient as a philosophy for handling those constraints?

(3) Does the 'harder-edged' ethic represented by Posner and other evolutionarily inspired utilitarians necessarily provide a more 'objective' account of the moral sphere?

S. Turner, "Making Normative Soup with Non-Normative Bones" in A. Sica, ed., What Is Social Theory?, pp. 118-144

R. Posner, "The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory," Harvard Law Review (May, 1998), pp. 1638-1693

R. Dworkin, "Darwin’s New Bulldog," Harvard Law Review (May, 1988)

R. Posner, "Reply to Critics," Harvard Law Review (May, 1998), pp. 1796-1806

R. Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It", Philosophy and Public Affairs (1996)

T. M. Scanlon, "Relativism", What We Owe to Each Other

D. Miller, "Distributive Justice: What the People Think", Ethics (1992)

A. Swift et al, "Distributive Justice: Does It Matter What the People Think?", J. Kleugel et al, Social Justice and Political Change

(1) How are preference and rational choice related? Does the instrumental conception of rational choice give us reason to care about anything?

(2) How do sociologists try to show that 'rationality' is not a univocal concept?

(3) Is the economic model of rationality necessarily anti-sociological?

M. Archer, 'Homo economicus, homo sociologicus, homo sentiens', in M. Archer and J. Tritter (eds.) Rational Choice Theory: Resisting Colonization

M. Hollis & R. Sugden, "Rationality in Action", Mind (1993)

S. Bowles & H. Gintis, "Is Equality Passe? Homo reciprocans and the future of egalitarian politics", Boston Review (Dec. 1998)

D. Gauthier, "Maximization Constrained: the Rationality of Cooperation", P. Moser, Rationality in Action or Morals by Agreement, ch. 6, esp. pp. 158-70

A. Gibbard, "Sociobiology", R. Goodin & P. Pettit, Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy

A. Gouldner, 'The Norm of Reciprocity', chaps. 7-9 of For Sociology

D. Parfit, "Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma", in J. Elster, Rational Choice

P. Singer, "Reciprocity", Ethics, sec. B.ii

B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, esp. chs. 1-3

P. Wagner, 'The bird in hand: rational choice -- the default mode of social theorizing in M. Archer and J. Tritter, Rational Choice Theory.

B. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", in Moral Luck, & P. Moser, ed. Rationality in Action

S. Williams, 'Is rational choice theory unreasonable? The neglected emotions.' In M. Archer and J. Tritter, Rational Choice Theory

1. In what respects would a feminist and/or multiculturalist social science differ from today's social sciences?
2. Where do feminists and multiculturalists disagree, both among themselves and with each other, over the nature of the challenge they pose to orthodox social science?
3. Logic teachers often invoke the 'genetic fallacy' to show that the origin of an idea is not relevant in judging its validity. To what extent do feminism and multiculturalism challenge this dictum?

J. Croissant, ‘Criteria for a Theory of Knowledge’ in A. Sica (ed.) What Is Social Theory? , pp. 145-76

N. Fraser and L. Nicholson, ‘Social Criticism without Philosophy’ in L. Nicholson (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism

E.F. Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science

S. Fuller, Science, chaps. 5-7

S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?

S. Harding, Is Science Multicultural?

S. Harding,ed. The Racial Economy of Science.

H. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge

C. McCarthy and R. Mahalingam (eds.), Multicultural Curriculum: New Directions for Social Theory, Practice and Policy

A. Oakley and J. Mitchell (eds.) Who’s Afraid of Feminism?

H. Rose, Love, Power and Knowledge

L. Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex

B. Skeggs, Formations of Class and Gender

D. Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge

L. Stanley and S. Wise, Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research

L. Stanley and S. Wise, Breaking Out Again: Feminist Epistemology and Ontology

C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition

1. To what extent do the feminist challenges discussed here depend on the personal experience of women versus the biological facts of the female condition -- or can these two things not be clearly distinguished?
2. Is the deconstruction of the sex/gender distinction ultimately disempowering?
3. What do you make of the often voiced claim that in Western science, women are discussed as if they were not fully human?

Preparatory Readings:

M. Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality, chap. 5

S. De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, introduction and conclusion

L. Irigaray, This Sex which is Not One, chap. 4

L. Birke, Women, Feminism, and Biology

L. Birke, Feminism and the Biological Body

R. Bleier, Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its Theories of Women

J. Butler, Bodies that Matter

J. Butler, Gender Trouble

1. Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality.

E. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism

D. Haraway, Primate Visions

D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, Women

S. B. Hrdy, The Woman that Never Evolved

S. B. Hrdy, Mother Nature

R. Hubbard, ed. Women's Nature

1. Are there trade-offs between pursuing the rights of women and of ethnic minorities?
2. Is Gilligan right that men are more concerned with justice and women with caring?
3. Why do you suppose that the institution of the family has not figured very prominently in modern social and moral theory?

S. M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Part 1, originally published in Boston Review [http://bostonreview.mit.edu] along with Replies; see esp. J. Raz, W. Kymlicka, Y. Tamir, Parekh, & C. Sunstein

C. Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and Morality", Harvard Educational Review (1977)

W. Kymlicka, "Feminism", Contemporary Political Philosophy

O. Flanagan & K. Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited", Ethics (1987)

Y. Tamir, "Hands Off Clitoridectomy", Boston Review, 21.3, and Replies 21.5 (1996)

G. Mackie, "Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account", American Sociological Review (1996)

M. Nussbaum and J. Glover (eds), Women, Culture and Development, esp. pp. 1-37, & 259-331

D. Estlund & M. Nussbaum, Sex, Preference, and the Family, part IV

S. M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, esp. ch. 8

(1) Are all large-scale social explanations inevitably 'functionalist' or 'teleological'?

(2) Distinguish some senses in which Marxism has and has not 'failed' in its dual mission to promote and explain radical social change.

(3) How are functional explanations in social science related to evolutionary explanations in biology? Are there any processes similar to natural selection in social life?

K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, chap. 4

J. Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: the Case for Methodological Individualism", Theory and Society (1982), and in A. Callinicos, Marxist Theory.

P. Casal, "On Societal and Global Historical Materialism", in C. Bertram & A. Chitty, Has History Ended?

G. A. Cohen, History Labour and Freedom, Chs 1 & 5

G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp. 278-296

G. A. Cohen, "Reply to Elster on Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory", Theory and Society (1982), and in A. Callinicos, Marxist Theory

J. Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Chs VIII, IX & X

A. Levine, E. Sober & E.O. Wright, "Marxism and Methodological Individualism", New Left Review (1987)

D. Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, Chs 5 & 9

S. Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered", in A. Ryan, Philosophy of Social Explanation (or British Journal of Sociology, 1968)

M. Martin & L. McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Parts V & VI

A. Rosenberg, Philosophy of Social Science, Ch 5

1. Is Wilson's critique of social science informed? Is it fair?
2. Is Wallerstein's positive vision of social science realistic? Is it realizable?
3. To what extent should the social sciences be accountable to developments in the natural sciences?

I. Wallerstein, Open the Social Sciences

E.O. Wilson, Consilience, chaps. 6-7

S. Blackmore, The Meme Machine

R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype

R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea

S. Fuller, 'The Coming Biological Challege to Social Theory and Practice' in J. Eldridge et al. (eds.) For Sociology

S.J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man

M. Midgley, Evolution as Religion

W.G. Runciman, The Social Animal

1. How does this new 'Social Darwinism' try to incorporate traditional socialist concerns for solidarity?
2. Why has Darwin fared so much better than Marx as a paradigm of scientific explanation?
3. Does Darwinism ultimately make one pessimistic about the prospects for human emancipation?

P. Singer, A Darwinian Left

E. Sober and D.S. Wilson, Unto Others, chaps. 4-5

P. Dickens, Social Darwinism

S. Fuller, 'The Darwinian Left: A Rhetoric of Realism or Reaction?', POROI (website)

P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid

M. Midgley, Beast and Man

H. Rose and S. Rose, eds. Alas Poor Darwin

P. Singer, Matters of Life and Death

R. Trigg, Understanding Social Science, chaps. 8-9

1. Are the genetically based choices surrounding ‘offspring design’ any more problematic than deciding which school one’s child will attend?
2. Do people have an obligation to share their ‘good genes’ with the rest of humanity?
3. Does eugenics presuppose authoritarianism -- or can it also happen in a liberal society?

R. Dworkin, ‘Offspring Design’, from the Boston Review

H. Steiner, ‘Silver Spoons and Golden Genes’, from J. Burley, ed. The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights

J. Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? esp. pts.1 - 2.

J. Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman (or Clones, Genes, and Immortality)

Special Issue on Genetics, Journal of Medical Ethics (1999)

J. Harris, ‘Goodbye Dolly? The ethics of human cloning’, Journal of Medical

Ethics, 23, 1997

D. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics

D. King, In the Name of Liberalism

M. Nussbaum et al, Clones and Clones

British Medical Association, Human Genetics

L. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World

E. Russo, & D. Cove, Genetic Engineering: Dreams and Nightmares, pt.3

M. Janker-Kenny, & L. Cahill, The Ethics of Genetic Engineering

M. Reiss & R. Straughan, Improving Nature

D. Heyd, Genethics

J. Robertson, Children of Choice

G. Pence, Who’s Afraid of Human Cloning?

R. Gosden, Designer Babies

M. Rantala, & A. Milgram, Cloning: For and Against

website: Human Cloning Foundation. http://www.humancloning.org

1. Do you think that all knowledge will eventually turn into intellectual property?: If not, how would you characterize the fields that are more and less vulnerable?
2. Do you believe that it would be wrong if all knowledge pursuits came to be seen as exercises in self-interest for private benefit? Why?

(3) How does 'genetic information' come to be taken up in the topics of this section?

W.W. Bartley, Unfathomed Knowledge, chap. 2

P. Croskery, "The Intellectual Property Literature: A structured Approach", in Weil and Snapper

B. Bates, "Information as an economic good: the sources of individual and social value". In V. Mosco and J. Wasko (eds.), The Political Economy of Information, pp. 76-94.

V. Weil and J. Snapper (eds.), Owning Scientific and Technical Information

S. Fuller, Knowledge Management Foundations, chaps. 1-2.

S. Fuller, "Society's Shifting Human-Computer Interface: A Sociology of Knowledge for the Information Age", Information, Communication and Society 1 (1998): 182-198.

R. Penslar (ed.) Research Ethics: Cases and Materials

M. Woodmansee and P. Jaszi (eds.), The Construction of Authorship.

1. What are the arguments for regarding knowledge as, on the one hand, promoting and, on the other, inhibiting power?
2. Can knowing too much be just as bad as knowing too little, when it comes to rational action?
3. In what sense can knowing the limits of one's knowledge be a source of power?

M. Dascal and O. Grunegard (eds.) Knowledge and Politics, chapter by Redner on Foucault and Nietzsche

Gigerenzer and Todd, G. Gigerenzer and P. Todd, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart, chap.1

J. Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science

C. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality

J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens.

D. Faust, The Limits of Scientific Reasoning.

S. Fuller, Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents

J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power

H. Simon, Sciences of the Artificial

R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics.

1. Are contemporary democracies in large nation-states too complex to enable rational collective judgements about the governance of society (e.g. through elections)?
2. Can an entire society 'learn' to make more rational political judgements? If not, why not? If so, what would be the content of such a 'civic education'?
3. On balance, has social science research contributed more to the expansion or contraction of democratic governance?

J. Bohman, Public Deliberation, chap. 7 on complexity and democracy

B. Barber, An Aristocracy of Everyone.

J. Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, Ethics 97 (1986): 26-38

M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (eds.), Knowledge and Politics, esp. Parts III, VI

G. Delanty, Social Science, chap. 7

J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems

J. Elster, Political Psychology, Introduction

J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation

S. Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge, Part III

1. Gutmann, Democratic Education

A. Haworth, Free Speech

W. Lippmann, Public Opinion

W. Riker, Liberalism against Populism

R. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?

D. Zolo, Democracy and Complexity

1. Are the attempts to attribute moral and intellectual standing to machines compatible with Neo-Darwinian attempts to blur the distinction between human and animal?
2. Are there different criteria for determining whether (or to what extent) machines have moral versus intellectual standing?
3. Are humans 'diminished' in some sense if machines acquire social standing?

I. Asimov, The Three Laws of Robots

K. Ford and C. Glymour (eds.). Android Epistemology, Part II

M. Boden, The Creative Mind

H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts

H.M. Collins and M. Kusch, The Shape of Actions

J. Coulter Mind in Action,

D. Dennett, Kinds of Minds

H. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Don’t Know

H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, Mind over Machine

J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea

WEEK TWENTY (07.03.02): Individual discussions with students about their works in progress.